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A Case of Communicative Learning?:  
$UHQGW¶V2YHUORRNHG,PSRUWDQFHIRU+DEHUPDV¶V3KLORVRSKLFDO3URMHFW 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT Jürgen Habermas has sought to set critical theory on firm normative 
foundations by drawing on thinkers outside the canon of Western Marxism. My basic 
thesis is that Hannah Arendt is a crucial but underappreciated resource for his intellectual 
development. To make this point I focus on AreQGW¶VLPSRUWDQFHIRU+DEHUPDV¶VZRUNRQ
the public sphere in the 1960s and the social theory he developed in the 1970s and 80s, 
despite his reluctance to cite her writings in his early career. More generally, I argue that 
reading Habermas critical theory WKURXJK$UHQGW¶VSROLWLFDOthought helps to clarify the 
importance of politics within his work, thus countering accusations that he is an abstract 
thinkHURI³KLJKOLEHUDOLVP´ XQLQWHUHVWHGLQ³UHDOSROLWLFV´ A greater appreciation of 
$UHQGW¶V ZRUNDVDFRQGLWLRQRISRVVLELOLW\IRU+DEHUPDV¶Vphilosophy demonstrates the 
importance of reading their work together as part of a common project, despite their 
disagreements. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS Hannah Arendt, Discourse Theory, Jürgen Habermas, Intellectual History, 
Critical Theory 
  
 2 
Introduction 
As the leader of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, Jürgen Habermas 
KDVVRXJKWWRUHVFXHFULWLFDOWKHRU\IURP³WKHSHVVLPLVWLFcul de sac´LQZKLFKMax 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno found themselves after the publication of the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (1944).1 One of his strategies has been to look for resources beyond the 
canon of Western Marxism. This search has led him to engage with many currents of 
twentieth century thought, including the systems theory of Talcott Parsons and Niklas 
Luhmann, the pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, the linguistic 
philosophy of J.L. Austin as well as the analytic political theory of John Rawls. The 
resulting ³LQWHUPLQJOLQJRIKHWHURJHQHRXVUHIHUHQFHV´KDVKHOSHG+DEHUPDVSURGXFHDQ
innovative philosophical synthesis.2 
My basic thesis is that this standard narrative underestimates the importance of a 
key resource for +DEHUPDV¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOGHYHORSPHQWWKDW of Hannah Arendt. This 
oversight is visible in the fact that most summaries RI+DEHUPDV¶VSKLORVRSK\overlook 
the crucial role Arendt played in clearing the ground for his discourse theory. For 
H[DPSOH+XJK%D[WHU¶VPRQRJUDSKZKLFKIRFXVHVRQ+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRU\RIODZGRHV
QRWPHQWLRQKHUDWDOO6LPLODUO\$UHQGWGRHVQRWDSSHDULQ0DWWKHZ6SHFWHU¶V
LQWHOOHFWXDOELRJUDSK\(YHQ0DUWLQ0DWXãWLN¶VH[DPLQDWLRQRI+DEHUPDV¶VLQWHOOHFWXDO
formation mentions Arendt only in connection with the trial of Adolf Eichmann.3 
                                                 
1
  Craig J. Calhoun, Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1992), 5. 
2
  Razmig Keucheyan, Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today, trans. Gregory 
Elliott (New York: Verso, 2013), 62. 
3
  Hugh Baxter, Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011); Matthew G. Specter, Habermas: An Intellectual 
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Martin Joseph 0DWXãWtN
 3 
7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDW$UHQGW¶VLPSRUWDQFHIRU+DEHUPDV¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOSURMHFW
has been completely ignored. However, it has been scholars of Arendt who have most 
frequently engaged this connection. However, by setting Arendt and Habermas on 
opposite sides of the communicative paradigm these accounts emphasize the differences 
between her agonistic political thought and his more rationalistic critical theory.4 One of 
the few exceptions to this tendency is Seyla Benhabib, who ³DVVRFLDWHVKHUYDULDQWRI
>FULWLFDOWKHRU\@ZLWK+DEHUPDV¶VµFRPPXQLFDWLYHHWKLFV¶DQG$UHQGW¶VUHSXEOLFDQLVP´5 
My approach here diverges from both of these strands. Instead of emphasizing the 
differences between the two or trying to combine their insights, I argue that Arendt¶V
LPSRUWDQFHIRU+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRUHWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWKDVQRWUHFHLYHGWKHDWWHQWLRQLW
deserves. I stress the similarities ± such as the fact that both Arendt and Habermas offer 
³WDONFHQWULF´UDWKHUWKDQ³YRWHFHQWULF´PRGHOVRIGHPRFUDF\± and the possibilities for 
mutual learning that emerge from reading them as part of a common philosophical 
project.6 In so doing I do not mean to downplay the important differences between them. 
However, I choose to highlight these overlooked parallels as part of a broader ³VWRU\RI
                                                 
Jürgen Habermas: A Philosophical-Political Profile (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2001), 21, 39. 
4
 See Margaret Canovan, "A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas 
and Arendt," Political Theory 11, no. 1 (February, 1983); Bonnie Honig, "Towards an 
Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity" in Feminist 
Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, ed. Bonnie Honig (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1995); Dana Richard Villa, "Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, 
Nietzsche and the Aestheticization of Political Action," Political Theory 20, no. 2 (May, 
1992). 
5
  Keucheyan, Left Hemisphere, 63. See Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
6
  James Bohman and William Rehg, "Introduction" in Deliberative Democracy: Essays 
on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1997), ix-xxvii; Mary F. Scudder, "Beyond Empathy: Strategies and Ideals of Democratic 
Deliberation," Polity 48, no. 4 (2016), 524-6. 
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HQFRXQWHUV´in twentieth century social and political thought between Freiburg and 
Frankfurt, i.e. between phenomenology and critical theory.7 
The kinds of assertions I make regarding intellectual influence are notoriously 
difficult to support. Corroborating such arguments LQYDULDEO\UHTXLUHV³PDNLQJDQXPEHU
of assumptions and theoretical claims that are not always clearly articulated but that are 
QHYHUWKHOHVVFHQWUDOWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQH[SODQDWLRQRULQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´These 
problems make LWQHFHVVDU\WR³EHKLJKO\VHOHFWLYHDVWRSHULRGSODFHDQGSUREOHP´7R
WKLVHQG,GLYLGHP\DUJXPHQWDERXW$UHQGW¶Lnfluence on Habermas into four stages.8 In 
the first periodZKLFKH[DPLQHV+DEHUPDV¶VZRUNLQWKHV I explore his reticence to 
cLWH$UHQGW¶VZRUN despite her clear influence on his early work. In the second, I engage 
with her importance in helping Habermas to develop his central analytic concept of 
communicative action in the 1970s and 80s.  
While Habermas underplays $UHQGW¶V impact on his thought in the first two 
periods, her influence is more visible in the third. Since 1990 Habermas has sought to 
apply his highly systematic social philosophy to political theory. Many commentators 
KDYHREVHUYHGWKDWWKLV³SROLWLFDOWXUQ´ has led him to modify some of his earlier ideas, 
such as the ideal speech situation and the consensus theory of truth.9 I place these 
                                                 
7
  Fred R. Dallmayr, "Phenomenology and Critical Theory: Adorno," Philosophy & 
Social Criticism 3, no. 4 (1976), 368. 
8
  Mark Philp, "Political Theory and History" in Political Theory: Methods and 
Approaches, eds. David Leopold and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 129-30; Knud Haakonssen, "Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought," 
Political Theory 13, no. 2 (May, 1985), 239. The first two of these periods closely mirror 
those provided b\'XYHQDJHZKRGRHVQRWGLVFXVV+DEHUPDV¶VSRVW-1990 political turn 
or his post-2000 engagement with religion in any detail. See Pieter Duvenage, Habermas 
and Aesthetics: The Limits of Communicative Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). 
9
 See James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A very Short Introduction, Vol. 125 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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revisions in context by KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHUROHWKDW+DEHUPDV¶VLQFUHDsing engagement with 
Arendt plays in this process, as is visible in the large uptick in his citations to her work. 
In the final period, which starts just after the turn of the second millennium, 
Habermas directs his attention to the role of religion in the democratic societies of the 
modern, industrialized West. This move continues his explicit engagement with Arendt, 
focusing in particular on two of her key concepts: the human condition of plurality and 
the potential of natality WRHQDEOH³QHZEHJLQQLQJV.´ This sustained reflection on Arendt 
leads Habermas to acknowledge the fundamental and irreconcilable differences between 
individuals within society. This leads him to distance himself from his previous attempts 
to purge public life and political institutions from explicitly religious influences and other 
ethical doctrines based on non-universal understandings of the good life. 
The implications of my argument are twofold. On the input side, I seek to bring 
JUHDWHUDWWHQWLRQWR$UHQGW¶Vrole as a key intellectual influence on Habermas and as a 
condition of possibility for his intellectual development. On the output side, the 
theoretical payoff for scholars of Habermas is to show how reading Habermas through 
Arendt can help to counteract overly rationalistic and idealistic interpretations of his 
work. This benefit is most visible the third and fourth stages, where Habermas focuses on 
the role discourse in the public sphere can play in leading citizens towards ³PXWXDO
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´Verständigung) without the need for agreement or consensus. Although 
Habermas is often accused of being a tKLQNHURI³KLJKOLEHUDOLVP´ZKRVHWKRXJKWFDQQRW
be applied to ³UHDOSROLWLFV´H[DPLQLQJKLVHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$UHQGWXQGHUVFRUHVWKH
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centrality of politics to his philosophical reflections.10 My basic thesis is that an 
appreciation of AreQGW¶VVLJQLILFDQFHIRU+DEHUPDV highlights the importance of public 
affairs wiWKLQ+DEHUPDV¶VEURDGHUphilosophical project. 
In making these claims, I interpret Arendt as a theorist of action through speech, 
i.e. of the pluralistic, communicatively-PHGLDWHGVSDFH³LQ-EHWZHHQ´LQGLYLGXDOV11 I 
contend that what Habermas takes from Arendt ± and then modifies for his own purposes 
± is a communicative, non-instrumental model of social action that is embedded in a 
³ZHERIUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGHQDFWHGVWRULHV´)RFXVLQJRQ$UHQGW¶VLPSDFWRQ+DEHUPDV± 
and on her importance in preparing the ground for his insights ± KLJKOLJKWV³DERQGWKDW
FDVWVKLVRZQSKLORVRSKLFDOFRPPLWPHQWVLQDXQH[SHFWHGOLJKW´12 
The argument is organized as follows: I start by outlining how Habermas draws 
on Arendt in his early work and detail their biographical connections. In the second 
section I argue that Habermas retained crucial Arendtian insights in developing the idea 
of communicative action even while his broader philosophical project drifted away from 
Arendtian themes in the 1970s and 1980V,WKHQVKRZKRZ+DEHUPDV¶VHQJDJHPHQW with 
her work since 1990 has helped him to develop a political theory that stresses 
disagreement within the chaotic public sphere of ³real´ politics. The fourth, penultimate 
                                                 
10
  Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
11
 For more on this reading of Arendt, see Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt; Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves, "Arendt's Theory of Judgment" in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Richard Villa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Margaret Canovan, "Arendt, Rousseau, and Human 
Plurality in Politics," The Journal of Politics 45, no. 2 (1983). 
12
  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 181-8; Peter E. Gordon, Adorno and Existence (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 3. 
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part HQJDJHVZLWK$UHQGW¶VUROHLQ+DEHUPDV¶V turn to religion since 2000. The 
conclusion examines how a concern for concrete historical developments animates the 
broader theoretical projects of both of these thinkers.  
 
Early Connections Regarding the Public Sphere 
Despite the relative lack of attention given to Arendt by scholars of Habermas, he 
has recently started to acknowledge her impact on his work. For example, in 2011 
Habermas observed, ³,DPLQGHEWHGWR>$UHQGW¶VHuman Condition], especially its model 
of the Greek public sphere, for essential stimuli for Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere´13 This admission is surprising because Habermas rarely cites Arendt in 
his early writings. Most remarkably, her name only appears three times in +DEHUPDV¶V
first book, even though it is redolent with Arendtian themes of open communication, 
publicity, human plurality DQGDFWLRQFRQFHLYHGLQWHUPVRI³ZRUGVDQGGHHGV´14 
All of the citations to Arendt in Structural Transformation (1962) are to The 
Human Condition (1958), where $UHQGW¶V develops her conception of politics as ³DFWLRQ
in concert.´This is surprising, given some of the glaring differences between these two 
works.15 For instance, although both thinkers engage in historical reflection, Arendt looks 
to ancient Greece whereas Habermas turns to the bourgeois public spheres of Germany, 
France and England. Additionally, Arendt seeks to develop her conception of action 
                                                 
13
  Jürgen Habermas, The Lure of Technocracy, trans. Ciaran Cronin, English ed. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 110. 
14
  Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 19, 251, 255. 
15
 For more on these differences, see Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah 
Arendt, 200-202; Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) ,73-98; Passerin 
d'Entrèves³Arendt's Theory of Judgment´-8. 
 8 
through a historical narrative that emphasizes how the exclusion of individuals from 
politics leads to the downfall of political orders. By contrast, Habermas highlights the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUHDVDVSDFHRIUHDVRQVZKHUH³WKHDXWKRULW\RIthe better 
DUJXPHQWFRXOGDVVHUWLWVHOI´16 
However, these differences mask some important similarities. Although Arendt 
does draw inspiration from the Greek polis, Christian Volk points out that her thought 
³GRHVQRWKDYHLWVQRUPDWLYHRULJLQLQ$WKHQVEXWUDWKHULQthe downfall of a European 
order based on the nation-state, the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of 
1DWLRQDO6RFLDOLVP´17 It is the experience of totalitarianism that induces her to go back to 
the ancients in search of a different model of politics. This is made clear not only in 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), but also in the prologue and final sections of The 
Human Condition, where she argues that the development of the twentieth century 
require DUHWXUQWRDQ³DFWLYH´ form of life (vita activaWKDWSODFHVWKH³ZHERIKXPDQ
UHODWLRQVKLSV´DWWKHFHQWHURIWKHKXPDQH[SHULHQFHRU³FRQGLWLRQ.´ These are the same 
concerns that drive +DEHUPDV¶Vproject and his fear RID³SROLWLFDOUHODSVH´WR1DWLRQDO
Socialism.18 
In addition to their search for a solution to the pathologies of (XURSH¶VH[SHrience 
of total war (1914-45), transforming informal communicative practice into formal 
decision-making is a central issue for both Arendt and Habermas. This concern explains 
                                                 
16
  Christian Volk, Arendtian Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of Freedom 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 179-80; Habermas, Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, 36, 102-4. 
17
  Volk, Arendtian Constitutionalism, 172. 
18
  Jürgen Habermas, "Public Space and Political Public Sphere: The Biographical Roots 
of Two Motifs  in My Thought" in Between Naturalism and Religion (London: , 2008), 
17. 
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Habermas attempts to theorize KRZ³FULWLFDOSXEOLFLW\´kritische Öffentlichkeit) can 
EHFRPHD³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\LQVWLWXWHGQRUP´LQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIStructural 
Transformation.19 Additionally, although Arendt is not usually thought of as an 
institutional thinker, she also recognizes the importance of communal political structures 
as a prerequisite for action. In The Human Condition she therefore DUJXHV³Before men 
began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent 
actions could take place´20 In this sense, they both realize that their shared 
communicative political paradigm will have to be linked to legitimate law created within 
formal institutional spaces. 
The VLPLODULWLHVEHWZHHQ$UHQGW¶VWKRXJKWDQG Structural Transformation takes on 
new importance in light of her book Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess (completed 
1933, published 1958). This monographZKLFKVHUYHGDV$UHQGW¶VHabilitationsschrift, 
presents a quasi-biographical account of the hostess of one of the most prominent 
nineteenth century salons in Berlin. This is important for my comparison because 
9DUQKDJHQ¶VVDORQLVDQH[FHOOHQWH[DPSOHRISUHcisely the kinds of spaces Habermas 
focuses on in his historical description of the public sphere in Structural Transformation 
(which, interestingly enough, was also his Habilitationsschrift). 
,WLVWUXHWKDW$UHQGW¶VVarnhagen did not make a big splash after its much-
delayed publication in 1958. There is no evidence to show that Habermas read or was 
aware of this book when he was composing his work on the public sphere. However, this 
fact only serves to make this comparison more interesting, given the similarity of their 
                                                 
19
  Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 237. 
20
  Arendt, Human Condition, 194-5. 
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EDVLFQRUPDWLYHFODLPV%XLOGLQJRQWKHH[DPSOHRI9DUQKDJHQ¶VVDORQ$UHQGWDUJXHV
WKDW³IRUDEULHIWLPHHYHU\RQHZKRFRXQWHGLQVRFLHW\KDGWXUQHGWKHLUEDFNVRQWKH
VRFLDOULJRUVDQGFRQYHQWLRQVKDGWDNHQIOLJKWIURPWKHP´21 This formulation bears a 
VWULNLQJUHVHPEODQFHWR+DEHUPDV¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHVHVDORQVJDYHELUWKWR³FRQFHSWRI
the humanity that was supposed to inhere in humankind as such and truly to constitute its 
DEVROXWHQHVV´EH\RQGWKHWUDGLWLRQDOERXQGDULHVRIFODVVSURIHVVLRQRUUHOLgion.22 
The parallels between the arguments of Rahel Varnhagen and Structural 
Transformation go even deeper. Both thinkers also note how quickly the bourgeois public 
sphere passed away as the boundaries between the public and private realms that made it 
posVLEOHGLVDSSHDUHG,QPDNLQJWKLVSRLQW+DEHUPDVGLDJQRVHVD³VWUXFWXUDO
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ´ZKHUHE\VWDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVLQVHUWHGWKHPVHOYHVLQWR³WKLVLQWHUPHGLDWH
sphere,´UHSODFLQJUHDVRQHGFULWLFDOSXEOLFLW\(kritische Öffentlichkeit) with the 
³PDQLSXODWLYHSXEOLFLW\´RIPRGHUQSXEOLFRSLQLRQ (opinion publique). Similarly, Arendt 
REVHUYHVWKDWWKH³GUHDPHGLG\OORIDPL[HGVRFLHW\´± ZKLFK³ZDVWKHSURGXFWRID
FKDQFHFRQVWHOODWLRQ´± ³FHDVHGWRH[LVWZKHQWKHSXEOLFZRUOG«EHFDPHVR
overwhelming that it couOGQRORQJHUEHWUDQVODWHGLQWRSULYDWHWHUPV´23 
It is perfectly possible that Arendt and Habermas developed their eerily similar 
reflections on the bourgeois public sphere separately.24 However, even if this is true, it 
does not explain why Habermas papers over his indebtedness to Arendt in the 1960s. 
                                                 
21
  Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 57. 
22
  Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 47. 
23
  Ibid., 176, 178; Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, 57, 122. 
24
 Structural Transformation was also influenced by a number of other thinkers, 
including Reinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt. See Michael Hofmann, Habermas's 
Public Sphere: A Critique (Lanham: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2017). 
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Reading the original text of Structural Transformation, with its three brief references to 
The Human Condition, certainly does not make it clear that Arendt was one of the 
³HVVHQWLDOVWLPXOL´IRUWKHERok, as Habermas admitted in 2011. 
It is possible to identify a number of plausible and perfectly legitimate 
explanations IRU+DEHUPDV¶VGRZQSOD\LQJRI$UHQGW at the time. The first focuses on her 
connection to Martin Heidegger. Habermas was infatuated with HeidegJHU¶VWKRXJKWDVD
young philosopher. However, he publicly rejected the philosopher he calls ³WKH*UHDW
,QIOXHQFH´DIWHU+HLGHJJHUUHSULQWHG the Introduction to Metaphysics ± originally 
delivered in 1935 ± ZLWKRXWUHPRYLQJDIDYRUDEOHUHIHUHQFHWRWKH³LQQer truth and 
JUHDWQHVV´RI1DWLRQDO6RFLDOLVP25 +DEHUPDV¶VFULWLTXHof Heidegger focuses on the 
ODWWHU¶V existential phenomenology. In particular, he argues that +HLGHJJHU¶V approach 
results in a subjectivist contempt for communication and intersubjectivity.  
$OWKRXJK$UHQGW¶Vemphasis RQKXPDQSOXUDOLW\H[SUHVVHGWKURXJK³ZRUGVDQG
GHHGV´PDNHVLWGLIILFXOWWROHYHOWKLVVDPHDFFXVDWLRQDWKHUshe does draw on her 
WHDFKHU¶V phenomenological method, which focuses on ³UHFRYHULQJH[SHULHnces and 
meanings that a layer of obfuscation had plunged into obscurity.´26 Habermas has always 
expressed some reticence regarding phenomenology, largely due to what he sees as its 
ungrounded normative foundations. Like Theodor Adorno, he is wary of its ³MDUJRQRI
authenticity,´HVSHFLDOO\LQOLJKWRIWKHPDVVPRELOL]DWLRQVwithin the Third Reich. It is 
                                                 
25
  Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 53-60; Jürgen Habermas, "Mit Heidegger gegen 
Heidegger denken. Zur Veröffentlichung von Vorlesungen aus dem Jahre 1935," 
Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung (25 Juli, 1953). 
26
  Dana Richard Villa, "Arendt, Heidegger, and the Tradition," Social Research 74, no. 4 
(winter, 2007), 984. 
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therefore possible that Habermas was wary of citing Arendt too frequently due to her 
connection to Heidegger and his existential phenomenology. 
A second explanation for +DEHUPDV¶VJORVVLQJ over RI$UHQGW¶VLQIOXHQFHRQKLV
thought can be linked to her well-known hostility to Karl Marx, a key theoretical 
touchstone for the critical theorists at the Institute for Social Research (Institut für 
Sozialforschung). Habermas was initially only employed at the Institute on a part-time 
contract, which may have made him wary of attacking Marx too openly. Although he had 
the support of Adorno, Max Horkheimer was suspicious of ³WKHGLDOHFWLFDO0U+.´ ± as 
he referred to Habermas in his personal correspondence ± for his political activism and 
his commitment to the rationalistic ideals of the Enlightenment.27 Additionally, Adorno, 
on whose support Habermas was wholly reliant, and Arendt were on famously bad 
personal terms.28 This animosity might very well have made Habermas wary of drawing 
on Arendt too frequently in the Habilitation he was planning on submitting to Adorno 
and Horkheimer. 
7KHLGHDWKDWWKHVHLQWHUSHUVRQDOGLIILFXOWLHVPLJKWEHWKHVRXUFHRI+DEHUPDV¶V
reluctDQFHWRIXOO\DFNQRZOHGJH$UHQGW¶VLPSRUWDQFHin his early work gain greater 
FUHGHQFHDVDUHVXOWRI+DEHUPDV¶VDFFRXQWRI his first meeting with Arendt. The two first 
encountered each other at a reception to welcome Habermas as the new Theodor Heuss 
Visiting Professor in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York in 
1967. Looking back upon this meeting, Habermas acknowledges feeling nervous and 
                                                 
27
 Horkheimer quoted in Stefan Müller-Doohm, Jürgen Habermas: Eine Biographie 
(Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), 113. 
28
  Lars Rensmann and Samir Gandesha, eds., Understanding Political Modernity: 
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intimidated. These emotions were immediately reinforced when Arendt approached him 
leading what KHGHVFULEHVDV³DNLQGRISKDODQ[´composed of Hans Jonas, Aaron 
Gurwitsch and their wives. Habermas recalls that Arendt opened their discussion 
³VWULNLQJO\KHDG-on [verblüffend frontal@´ZLWKWKHZRUGV ³And so you come from this 
institute in Frankfurt«">8QG6LHNRPPHQDOVRDXVGLHVHP,QVWLWXWLQ)UDQNIXUW«"@´29 
This was not the most auspicious start to their relationship. Habermas notes that 
these words immediately ³WRUHRSHQWKHDE\VV>Abgrund@´ that had formed two decades 
earlier between the German émigrés at the New School and his predecessors at the 
Institute, which had been associated with Columbia University in the early 1940s.30 
Despite these tensions, as well as the preexisting animosity between Adorno and Arendt, 
their rather unfortunate first meeting did not prevent Arendt from arranging and 
moderating a lecture Habermas held at the Goethe-Institute in New York. In his talk he 
compared the student protest movement in Berlin to its counterparts in Berkeley and 
Paris. Although the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung UHSRUWVWKDW³DYHU\ORQJDQGOLYHO\
GLVFXVVLRQHQVXHG´WKHUHLVQRLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJ$UHndt¶V UHDFWLRQWR+DEHUPDV¶V
lecture.31 However, it is clear that their personal interaction was strained by his 
connection to Adorno and the Institute. 
Habermas may also have been reluctant to cite Arendt due to her conservative 
political views. In a letter to his friend, the publicist Hans Paeschke (dated 9 March 1966) 
Habermas confirms this concern and his evaluation of Arendt, GHVFULELQJKHUDV³D
                                                 
29
  Jürgen Habermas and Rachel Salamander, "'Jeder von den Emigranten konnte nach 
1945 nur als Jude zurückkommen!': Jürgen Habermas im Gespräch mit Rachel 
Salamander," Münchner Beiträge zur jüdische Geschichte und Kultur 6, no. 1 (2012), 13. 
30
  Ibid., 13-4. 
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frightfully reactionary, and yet even more impressive person [eine schrecklich 
reaktionäre, aber mindestens ebenso imponierende Person].´ Relatedly, given $UHQGW¶V
focus on recovering a conception of politics from the Greeks, whose social relations 
relied on the existence of slavery and the exclusion of women to provide the leisure for 
an exclusively male citizenry to engage fully in the life of the polis, Habermas has also 
consistently criticized her elitism. Despite his reservations, however, in another letter to 
Paeschke, this one GDWHG0DUFK+DEHUPDVREVHUYHVWKDW³0UV$UHQGWLVD
shining and very live counter-example to the sticky prejudice [zähe Vorurteil] that 
ZRPHQFDQQRWGRSKLORVRSK\´32 He notes that she presents ³DWZRIROGUHEXWWDORIDQ
academic prejudice that my teacher Erich Rothacker had repeated in his seminar in the 
HDUO\VDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKµ-HZVDQG ZRPHQ¶VXSSRVHGO\FDQRQO\DPRXQWWR
µVHFRQG-UDWHVWDUOHWV¶LQSKLORVRSK\´33 
:KLOHWKHSUHFHGLQJFRQFHUQVPD\KDYHLQFUHDVHG+DEHUPDV¶VDYHUVLRQWRFLWLQJ
Arendt, they did not keep him from acknowledging some of the positive aspects of her 
ZRUN5HIOHFWLQJRQ$UHQGW¶VOn Revolution (1963) in an essay that originally appeared 
in Merkur ± a journal edited by Paeschke ± +DEHUPDVFUHGLWV$UHQGWIRU³KDYLQJWKH
courage to rehabilitate the council system as the only form of republic that is thinkable 
WRGD\´,QKLVUHYLHZRIWKH*HUPDQWUDQVODWLRQRIWKLVZRUNZKLFKDSSHDUHGLQ
HabHUPDVSUDLVHG$UHQGWIRUUHFRJQL]LQJWKDW³IUHHGRPIURPUHSUHVVLRQWKHJRDORIDOO
revolutions since the eighteenth century, will remain a chimera as long as political will-
formation is not based on the principle of popular discussion without domination 
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[allgemeiner und herrschaftsfreier Diskussion@´34  
In making this claim, Habermas may be reading his own thought into On 
Revolution, which actually focuses more on the importance of local councils as the key 
sites of democratic life than on the abstract principles of discourse that are supposed to 
govern therein. Arendt does indeed argue for the importance of discourse in political life, 
noting, ³2SLQLRQVDUHIRUPHGLQDSURFHVVRIRSHQGLVFXVVLRQDQGSXEOLFGHEDWHDQG
where no opportunity for the forming oIRSLQLRQVH[LVWVWKHUHPD\EHPRRGV«EXWQR
RSLQLRQ´ However, she says nothing about the rules that govern this ³opinion-
formation,´ to use Habermasian language. On the contrary, she rejects the use of formal 
rules as a criterion of legitimate argumentation, arguing instead that rhetoric and 
persuasion have a key role to play in SROLWLFV³VHHQLQWHUPVRIperformance´35 
5HJDUGOHVVRIWKHDFWXDOUHDVRQVIRU+DEHUPDV¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRFLWe Arendt, by his 
own admission his early work is more indebted to her than he was willing to admit at the 
time. Seyla Benhabib makes this point even more emphatically, arguing³-UJHQ
+DEHUPDVLVLQGHEWHGWR+DQQDK$UHQGW«WKURXJKWKHODWWHU
VUHGLVFRYHURIWKHFRQFHSWRI
the public space´$GGLWLRQDOO\she FRQWHQGV³Habermas's crucial distinction between 
µODERU¶DQGµLQWHUDFWLRQ¶ZKLFKLVDWWKHRULJLQRIKLVFRQFHSWRIµFRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQ¶
LVGHHSO\LQGHEWHGWR$UHQGW
VFULWLTXHRI.DUO0DU[´36 
Reflecting back on his visit to the New School during his commencement address 
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to the student body in 1980, Habermas also notes $UHQGW¶V importance in helping him to 
XQGHUVWDQG³WKHYHQHUDEOHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSRLHVLVDQGSUD[LV´ More importantly, he 
observes³,KDYHOHDUQHGIURP+Arendt how to approach a theory of communicative 
action.´37 This acknowledgment ± FRPELQHGZLWKIDFWWKDW$UHQGW¶VQDPHRQO\DSSHDUV
twice in the whole two-volume text of The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) ± 
raises important further questions about AUHQGW¶VLQIOXHQFHRQ+DEHUPDV¶VWKRXJKW
between his work on the public sphere in the 1960s and his political turn after 1990. 
 
Sociological Divergence and Communicative Action 
+DEHUPDV¶VHDUO\ZRUNVKRZVsome UHPDUNDEOHVLPLODULWLHVWR$UHQGW¶VSROLWLFDO
theory. However, in the 1970s and 80s his thought moves away from explicitly Arendtian 
themes and is more obviously influenced by his engagement with Parsons, Luhmann, 
Dewey, Austin and Mead. This presents something of a conundrum. On the one hand, 
Habermas retains an Arendtian emphasis on the discursive nature of power in developing 
the concept of communicative action in this period. On the other, the consensus theory of 
truth, the ideal speech situation and his commitment to agreement all seemingly run 
FRXQWHUWR$UHQGW¶Vacknowledgement of ³the irreducible pluralism that characterizes 
contemporary societies and the agonistic politics that stems from it.´38 
Given +DEHUPDV¶VVKLIWLQJLQWHUHVWV and his preexisting reluctance to refer to 
Arendt, it is perhaps not surprising that few of the philosophical manuscripts he produced 
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  Jürgen Habermas, "On the German-Jewish Heritage," Telos 44 (summer, 1980), 128-
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38
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during this time cite her work. I have already referred to one of the main exceptions, the 
1980 commencement address at the New School. Immediately after crediting Arendt for 
teaching him how to approach the idea of communicative action by stressing the human 
FDSDFLW\IRU³acting LQFRQFHUW´coordinated E\³ZRUGVDQGGHHGV´+DEHUPDV notes, 
³ZKDW,FDQQRWVHHLVWKDWWKLVDSSURDFKVKRXOGEe in contradiction to a critical theory of 
VRFLHW\´Instead of seeing her as opposed to critical theory, Habermas contends that 
$UHQGW¶VZRUN LV³DVKDUSDQDO\WLFDOLQVWUXPHQWIRUVDYLQJWKH0DU[LVWWUDGLWLRQIURPLWV 
RZQSURGXFWLYLVWDEHUUDWLRQV´39 
Speaking an heir to the Western Marxist tradition, which stresses the Hegelian 
philosophical foundations RI0DU[¶VHDUO\work+DEHUPDVDUJXHV³:KDW0DU[FDOOHG
kritisch-praktische Tätigkeit, revolutionary praxis in its most general sense, could not be 
elXFLGDWHGPRUHVWULNLQJO\WKDQE\+$UHQGW´ZKR³FRQQHFWVWKHHPDQFLSDWRU\IUHHGRP
that comes from being liberated with the creative freedom that arises out of the 
VSRQWDQHLW\RIIRXQGLQJVRPHWKLQJQHZ´ $SSHDOLQJWR$UHQGW¶VLQIOXHQFHRQKLVHDUO\
writings+DEHUPDVQRWHVWKDWKHUIRFXVZDVRQKRZPDQ¶V³FUHDWLYHIUHHGRP´could be 
institutionalized in the public sphere. Although this is an important task, he argues that it 
overlooks ³the descriptive question as to how that space of appearance which forms the 
KRUL]RQRIHYHU\GD\OLIHDFWXDOO\ZRUNV´40 
In order to succeed in making these Arendtian insights compatible with critical 
theory, Habermas reinterprets her work through 0DU[¶VHDUO\philosophical writings, 
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where he postulates that PDQ¶VQDWXUHLVWREHD³free conscious producer.´41 There is a 
certain irony to this move, given Arendt¶V conclusion WKDW0DU[¶VGHVLUHWRXQLI\WKH
disparate identities of human beings into a single, economically-defined (and hence 
³SURGXFWLYH´VWDWXVVignals the end of action, the withering away of the public space of 
appearance, and the death of the political. However, instead of getting caught up in the 
different spheres Marx and Arendt associate with freedom, Habermas seeks to bring them 
together into a single normative perspective. 
In order to do this, Habermas turns to the concept of ³the lifeworld´ (Lebenswelt) 
developed by Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz. He distinguishes this area of life from 
the material space of ³the system´ by building on the work of Parsons and Luhmann. 
Following Marx, Habermas associates systems with material production governed by the 
instrumental use of power and money. By contrast, the lifeworld is the PRUH³Arendtian´ 
sphere of culture and unthematized background assumptions, where individuals 
coordinate action with each other through speech. Despite the interactions between the 
system and the lifeworld, Habermas argues that they must remain separate for society to 
preserve the status of individuals as communicative, social beings.42 
Habermas ultimately sides with Arendt over Marx, associating social freedom 
with communicative action in the lifeworld. Like the bourgeois public sphere of 
Structural Transformation, which served to legitimate governmental authority while 
UHPDLQLQJLQWKHSULYDWHUHDOP+DEHUPDVDUJXHVWKDWWKH³FRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQ´RIWKH
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lifeworld must exercise control over the operations of material systems, setting 
boundaries on its sphere of operation WRSUHYHQWWKH³FRORQL]DWLRQRIWKHOLIHZRUOG´
(Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt) by instrumental concerns.43 This fear of colonization 
bears a striking resemblance to the argument of the second half of Structural 
Transformation, with its account of the destruction of the distinction between public and 
SULYDWHWKDWPDGHWKHSXELFVSKHUHSRVVLEOHLQWKHILUVWSODFHDQGZLWK$UHQGW¶VDQDO\VLV
of the threat WR³acting LQFRQFHUW´SRVHGE\³WKHULVHRIWKHVRFLDO´ 
Although Habermas¶VFULWLFDO-WKHRUHWLFDSSURDFKGLIIHUVJUHDWO\IURP$UHQGW¶V
phenomenological search for the origins of basic concepts, both of their accounts rely on 
the separation of different spheres of life associated with different human activities. Thus, 
³+DEHUPDVSURYLGHV«DUHDGLQJZKLFKVWUHVVHVKHUGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDFWLRQDQG
VSHHFKRQRQHKDQGDQGZRUNODERUDQGLQVWUXPHQWDOLW\RQWKHRWKHU´44 It is hardly 
DFFLGHQWDOWKDW+DEHUPDV¶VRZQVRFLDOWKHRU\± developed in part through a reading of 
Arendt, despite the paucity of citations to her work ± reproduces this same bifurcation by 
divorcing the system from the lifeworld and associating these two areas of life with 
strategic, instrumental rationality and communicative or substantive reason respectively. 
What is most important for my argument is that Habermas uses the distinction 
between system and lifeworld to bridge the divide between Marx and Arendt. By 
H[SDQGLQJ$UHQGW¶VFRPPXQLFDWLYHLQVLJKWVVRWKDWthey can serve as the normative 
foundation for his understanding of social interaction, Habermas sets out to save critical 
theory ± and Marxism more generally ± from the problems of dialectical materialism. 
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This analysis also helps to explain why Habermas credits Arendt for providing him with 
³DILUVWDSSURDFK to a concept of communicative rationality which is built into speech and 
DFWLRQLWVHOI´45 
While Habermas draws heavily on Arendt, his work also differs from hers in 
important ways. As the previous quotation makes clear, he often associates the phrase 
³FRPmunicative action´with ³FRPPXQLFDWLYHrationality.´ This connection signals an 
important ± perhaps even his most significant ± departure from Arendt. Treating action 
and rationality almost interchangeably injects a deep-seated faith in the power of ³WKH
XQIRUFHGIRUFHRIWKHEHWWHUDUJXPHQW´(der zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments). 
This connection of truth and rationality to politics marks Habermas as an heir to the 
Frankfurt School. In line with their commitment to Western Marxism, the founders of 
critical theory KHOGWKDW³7UXWKLVDPRPHQWRIFRUUHFWSUD[LV´+RUNKHLPHUDQGWKDW
³3UDctice follows truth, and not vicHYHUVD´0DUFXVH.46 
,QFRQWUDVWWR+DEHUPDV¶Vsearch for DGLVFXUVLYHO\DFKLHYHG³FRQVHQVXVWKHRU\RI
truth´for Arendt the force of the better argument is anything but unforced. On the 
contrary, Arendt is wary of both ³WKHutopian tyrannies of reason with which the 
philosophers ZLVKHGWRFRHUFHPHQ´ and ³W\UDQQLHVRIµWUXWK¶ZKLFKRIFRXUVH
politically speaking, are as tyrannical as other forms RIGHVSRWLVP´ In contrast to 
+DEHUPDV¶VUHMHFWLRQRIrhetoric as a form of strategic action that seeks to win arguments 
through manipulation, Arendt sees persuasion DVDQHVVHQWLDOSDUWRI³WKHSDVVLRQDWHGULYH
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WRVKRZRQH¶VVHOILQPHDVXULQJXSDJDLQVWRWKHUV´WKDWGHILQHVWKHDJRQDOQDWXUHRI
public life.47 $OWKRXJKERWK+DEHUPDV¶VDYHUVLRQWRDIIHFWDQG$UHQGW¶VUHMHFWLRQRI
reason should not be overstated ± a careful reading shows that each of them appreciates 
both reason and affect ± their theoretical emphasis is different. 
In his consideration of the relationship between their thought, David Luban argues 
that +DEHUPDVKDVWUDQVIRUPHG$UHQGW¶VLGHDRI³DFWLRQLQFRQFHUW´LQWR³GHOLEHUDWLRQLQ
FRQFHUW´48 This move is most clearly stated in +DEHUPDV¶V HVVD\³+DQQDK$UHQGW
On the Concept of Power,´where he credits Arendt for proceeding from a novel model of 
DFWLRQZKRVHJRDO³LVQRWWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOL]LQJRIDQRWKHU
VZLOOIRURQH
VRZQSXUSRVHV
but the formation of a common will in a communication aimed at agreement.´ While 
Habermas immediately distances himself from the ³SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOPHWKRGE\ZKLFK
$UHQGW¶VSKLORVRSK\RISUD[LVLVFDUULHGRXW´KHDUJXHVWKDWKHU³LQWHQWLRQLVFOHDU6KH
wants to read off the general structures of an unimpaired intersubjectivity in the formal 
properties of communicative action or pra[LV´49 
Once again it seems as though Habermas has taken ArHQGW¶VIRFXVRQ
communication and adapted it for his own purposes. In contrast to his model of 
communicative action, where individuals allow themselves ³WREHSHUVXDGHGE\WKHWUXWK
of a statement, the rightness of a norm, or the truthfulness of an utterance,´ Arendt¶V
political theory FKDPSLRQVDPXFKORRVHUIRUPRIDJUHHPHQWEDVHGRQ³WKHEDFN-and-
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IRUWKRIGHEDWHDQGWKHSUDFWLFHRISHUVXDVLRQ´50 She is concerned less with what 
+DEHUPDVFDOOVWKH³coercion-IUHHIRUFHZLWKZKLFKLQVLJKWSUHYDLOV´DQGPRUHZLWKWKH
ability of words to persuade individuals to act together for a common purpose. This is not 
a cognitive process, but one based on a form of storytelling that allows actors to ³¶ZRR¶
RUµFRXUW¶WKHDJUHHPHQWRIHYHU\RQHHOVH´51 
This focus on the ability of action to ground collective identity is also visible in 
$UHQGW¶VH[DPSOHV± such as the Hungarian uprising of 1956 ± which highlight the 
³VSRQWDQHRXVRUJDQL]DWLRQDOHIIRUWVRIWKHSHople themselvHV´WKDWDLPWRIRUP³DQHZ
ERG\SROLWLF´52 This emphasis LVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWIURP+DEHUPDV¶VDWWHPSWVWRRXWOLQHWKH
IRUPDOFULWHULDIRUGLVFXUVLYHUHVROXWLRQRIGLVDJUHHPHQWVEDVHGRQWKH³XQIRUFHGIRUFHRI
WKHEHWWHUDUJXPHQW´DQGUHYHDOV$UHQGW¶VPRUHDJRQDODSSURDFKWRSROLWLFV,VKDOOUHWXUQ
to this point in the next section, where I discuss their respective approaches to mediating 
the relationship between politics and law. 
Although he does not cite or engage with Arendt frequently in this period, an 
examination of the available evidence shows that Arendt served as the theoretical 
insSLUDWLRQIRU+DEHUPDV¶Vconcept of communicative action. However, it is also clear 
WKDWKLV³UHFRQVWUXFWion of the communications concept of power contains, it must be 
said, more Habermas than Arendt.´53 5HIOHFWLQJRQ+DEHUPDV¶VUHDGing of Arendt, 
Margaret Canovan goes even further, contending WKDW³LWLVDWH[WERRNFDVHRI«GLVWRUWHG
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ´,QGHHGVKHQRWHVWKDW³LQWKHFRXUVHRIWDNLQJXSKHULGHDVKH
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transformed them very considerably, with the result that what he learned from Arendt 
ZDVQRWTXLWHZKDWVKHZRXOGKDYHOLNHGWRWHDFKKLP´ 
Canovan DUJXHVWKDW+DEHUPDV¶VODFNRILQWHUHVWLQWKHpolitical implications of 
his hyper-rationalized interpretation of Arendt in this second period causes him to miss 
the core insight of her theoretical project: her focus on the inescapable plurality of human 
beings. Thus, agreement for Arendt cannot be based oQ³WKHLQWHOOHFWXDOEXVLQHVVRI
GLVFXVVLRQ´,QVWHDG³WKHLPSOLFDWLRQ$UHQGWGUDZVIURPWKLVLVWKDWWKHSXEOLFZRUOGDQG
LWVLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHWKHRQO\PHDQVRIKROGLQJSOXUDOLQGLYLGXDOVWRJHWKHULQIUHHGRP´54 
While she notes the inaccuracy RI+DEHUPDV¶V reading of Arendt, Canovan at 
least partially exonerates KLPQRWLQJWKDW³WKHGLVWRUWLRQ[is] caused not by domination, 
ideology or neurosis, but by intellectual vitality on the part of the reader [i.e. 
Habermas]´55 She argues that +DEHUPDV¶VPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI$UHQGW¶VYLHZVDUHWKH
result of his attempts to integrate her thought into his own philosophical framework. As I 
show in the next section, Habermas develops a less distorted reading of Arendt as a result 
of his renewed interest in political theory after 1990. 
 
Convergence on Politics 
After completing his two-volume Theory of Communicative Action (1981) and 
positioning himself vis-à-vis the FRQWLQHQW¶Vtheoretical tradition in The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity (1985), Habermas once again turned his attention to political 
theory. This shift is visible in the major works he produced in the 1990s, such as Between 
Facts and Norms (1992) and The Inclusion of the Other (1996). In contrast to his early 
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work, where he avoided citing Arendt even when discussing core themes related to her 
WKRXJKW+DEHUPDV¶Vpolitical writings are characterized by an explosive uptick of 
citations and references to her work. This trend is most pronounced in Between Facts and 
Norms, where her name appears 30 times. 
In this work Habermas argues that ³DFW>LRQ@LQFRQFHUWPXVWEHPRELOL]HGDQG
effectively secured within the legal medium itself.´56 In so doing he draws considerably 
on Arendt, linking the idea of communicative power WR³Dprocedure of lawmaking that 
EHJHWVOHJLWLPDF\´57 The connection he draws between democratic legitimacy and what 
he calls ³KHDOWK\GLVFXUVLYHSURFHVVHV´DOORZV+DEHUPDVWRWUDQVODWHinformal 
communicative power into formal administrative authority (or administrative power, as 
he sometimes refers to it). This focus on the legal mediation of discourse also explains his 
joking reference to himself as ³DOD\MXULVW.´58  
Despite +DEHUPDV¶VGHSOR\PHQWRIWKH$UHQGWLDQFRQFHSWRIFRPPXQLFDWLYH
power, it might seems as though his focus on the law would clash ZLWK$UHQGW¶VPRUH
SHUIRUPDWLYHVHDUFKIRUWKHVSRQWDQHRXV³QHZEHJLQQLQJV´IRXQGLQPRPHQWVsuch as the 
Hungarian Revolution. However, recent scholarship has increasingly come to argue that 
³$UHQGWIRUWRRORQJKDVEHHQLJQRUHGDVDQLPSRUWDQWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWKLQNHU´59 As a 
result, these differences mask some important similarities. 
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For instance, both Habermas and Arendt seek to respond to Max Weber, whose 
formal conception of rationally administered law seemingly leaves no space for the 
political. Much like Habermas, who contends that politics and law (as well as democracy 
and KXPDQULJKWVDUH³FR-RULJLQDO´DQG³HTXL-SULPRUGLDO´60 Arendt also argues for the 
³GHKLHUDUFKLVDWLRQ´RIODZDQGSROLWLFV6KHGHYHOops an ³LPSHUDWLYHFRQFHSWLRQRIODZ´
that creates a place for action, i.e. WKHVWDWHWKDW³LVHVVHQWLDOO\RUJDQL]HGDQG
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGSRZHU´61 In this sense, Christian Volk notes that Arendt 
³desubstantializes the concept of law´ by DUJXLQJWKDW³WKHODZLVOHJLWLPDWHZKHQLW
DOORZVDQGHQDEOHVSROLWLFDODFWLRQWRWDNHSODFH´62 Despite their remaining differences ± 
VXFKDV+DEHUPDV¶VIRFXVRQWKHIRUPDOUXOHVWKDWJRYHUQlegitimate decision-making 
FRPSDUHGWR$UHQGW¶VFRQFHUQZLWKWKe durability and stability of the political ± their 
desire to turn the opposition between politics and law into a relationship is a key parallel 
that emerges from Between Facts and Norms. 
As I pointed out earlier, +DEHUPDV¶V work in the 1970s and 80s was fairly abstract 
and analytic, focusing on what identifying what he calls ³WKHJHQHUDOVWUXFWXUHVRIDQ
XQLPSDLUHGLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\LQWKHIRUPDOSURSHUWLHVRIFRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQRUSUD[LV´ 
$NH\SDUWRIWKLVV\VWHPZDVWKHIRUPDOL]HGPRGHORIWKH³LGHDO VSHHFKVLWXDWLRQ´ZKRVH
³GHILQLQJIHDWXUH«LVWKDWDQ\FRQVHQVXVDWWDLQDEOHXQGHULWVFRQGLWLRQVFDQFRXQW per se 
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as a rational consensus.´63 This move is part of Habermas broader attempt to revise 
Immanuel .DQW¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQWHUPV RID³SURFHGXUDOUDWLRQDOLW\´
that is not rooted in the individual, but in the intersubjective practice of communicative 
rationality. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas observes WKDWKHLV³>I@ROORZLQJ 
Arendt¶VOHDG´LQ noting WKDWWKH³VHOI-referential structure of the public practice issuing 
IURPFRPPXQLFDWLYHSRZHU´FDQRSHUDWHWKURXJK ³VXEMectless forms of communication 
that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a way that their 
fallible outcomHVKDYHWKHSUHVXPSWLRQRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQRQWKHLUVLGH´64 This approach 
DOORZV+DEHUPDVWRPDLQWDLQDOLQNEHWZHHQKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISROLWLFVDQG.DQW¶V
moral theory by arguing that open debate allows individuals to treat the other as an end 
and not a means. 
Despite her appreciatioQIRU.DQWDQG+DEHUPDV¶VH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWRKHUZRUN 
Arendt would resist this move. For her, communicative power is not something that 
needs to be linked to administrative power in order to ensure the legitimacy of the law in 
terms of its moral validity. On the contrary, she is interested in the state and its 
institutions only insofar as they enable individual judgment to become part of a broader, 
shared sensus communis that works through ³WKHRSHUaWLRQRIUHIOHFWLRQ´7hese 
judgments are not adjudicated by criteria of legitimacy or the fulfillment of moral validity 
                                                 
63
  Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles, 175; Jürgen Habermas, On the 
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64
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claims, but through WKH³FRPPXQLFDELOLW\´the core ideas agreed to by the collective, 
ZKLFKVKHDUJXHV³VWDELOL]H HYHU\IDFWRURISROLWLFDOOLIHLQWRDµODVWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQ¶´65 
,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH³HWKLFDOIRUPDOLVP´WKDW+DEHUPDVGUDZVIURP.DQW¶Vmoral 
theory in developing his discourse theory of law, for Arendt morality is a question of 
FRQVFLHQFHRIWKH³LQWHUQDOGLDORJXH´EHWZHHQ³PHDQGP\VHOIWKHWZR-in-RQH´required 
WROLYHZLWKRQHVHOIDQGRQH¶VGHHGV66 6KHLVOHVVLQWHUHVWHGLQ.DQW¶VPRUDOWKHRU\DQG
his second Critique of Practical Reason (1788) than his political writings and the third 
Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). Thus, instead of an ethical formalism of 
practical reason, Arendt VHHNVWR³allow an ethics of power to develop out of judgment 
[Lässt sich eine Ethik der Macht aus der Urteilskraft entwickeln].´67 Her theory is not 
based on fundamental moral principles, but on a historical narrative about the durability 
of a free and stable political order. Volk concludes that this difference in their respective 
readings of Kant can explain many of the philosophical disjunctions between Habermas 
DQG$UHQGW³SUDFWLFDOUHDson, knowledge and the epistemic function of democracy on the 
one side; [the] political power of judgement, experience and the emphasis on the 
GLPHQVLRQVRIPHDQLQJRISROLWLFDODFWLRQRQWKHRWKHU´68 
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Moving on from their respective interpretations of Kant, I want to argue that 
aSSUHFLDWLQJ+DEHUPDV¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$UHQGW± and reading his later work in this 
light ± makes it clear that politics and real world debates are central to his broader 
philosophical project. Instead of focusing on the implicit validity claims to truth 
(Wahrheit), truthfulness (or sincerity [Wahrhaftigkeit]) and normative rightness 
(Richtigkeit) that are inherent in linguistic communication, in his political theory 
Habermas has returned to the public sphere as the chaotic site of informal opinion-
formation that underpins modern democratic practice. He contends WKDW³RUJDQL]HG
opinion-formation, which leads to accountable decisions within government bodies, 
[must remain] permeable to the free-floating values, issues, contributions, and arguments 
RIDVXUURXQGLQJSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´WKat occurs in real public debate. Instead of 
focusing on the formal procedures of the ideal speech situation, Habermas comes to argue 
WKDWSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVDUHWKH³fallible result of an attempt to determine what is right 
through a discussion that has been brought to a provisional close under the pressure to 
GHFLGH´69  
This VKLIWLQHPSKDVLVKHOSVWRFODULI\WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ+DEHUPDV¶V
formal social theory and the role that the communicative norms he develops there play in 
real public debate. For example, in The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas 
argues WKDW³XQGHUVWDQGLQJLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHDSURFHVVRIUHDFKLQJDJUHHPHQW
[Einigung] DPRQJVSHDNLQJDQGDFWLQJVXEMHFWV´However, while he maintains his 
commitment to agreement as an ideal, in his political theory he stresses the space for 
reasonable disagreement ± what Arendt refers to as pluralism ± within the public sphere 
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of a liberal-democratic society.70 In applying his moral theory to politics, Habermas still 
KROGVRXW³WKHDVVHQWRIDOOFLWL]HQVLQDdiscursive process of legislation that has been 
OHJDOO\FRQVWLWXWHG´DVDQDVSLUDWLRQDOJRDO, but he recognizes that in practice this ideal 
will have to be instantiated in imperfect ways.71 
As a result of these considerations, Habermas notes that modern, pluralistic 
societies that can no longer expect full agreement even on fundamental issues. In his 
political theory he therefore drops some of the language of consensus (Konsens) and 
agreement (Einigung or Einverständnis), stressing instead the idea that open 
communication in the public sphere can lead citizens ³PXWXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´
(Verständigung) of their differences without full unanimity. Patchen Markell argues that 
in light of his political theory it is possible to reUHDG+DEHUPDV¶s previous ³RULHQWDWLRQ
WRZDUGDJUHHPHQW´VLPSO\DVDFDOOIRU³a foreswearing of the mechanism coercion and 
inIOXHQFHLQWKHSXUVXLWRIRQH¶s goals and a corresponding commitment to provide 
reasRQVIRURQH
VFODLPVLIWKH\DUHFKDOOHQJHG´72 This interpretation ± which is made 
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SRVVLEOHLQSDUWE\+DEHUPDV¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$UHQGW± narrows the gap between their 
two theories, at least to a certain extent. 
This is not to say that Habermas has completely abandoned his rational 
framework in order to embrace a more Arendtian model. He has not. Habermas maintains 
his commitment to the counterfactual of the ³XQIRUFed force of the better argument´as 
the regulative ideal of communicative action. However, it is sufficient for a successful 
DQGIXQFWLRQLQJSXEOLFVSKHUH³that participants abide by some basic rules of civility, 
including a commitment to listen as well as speak, and, when one speaks, to do so in 
good faLWKDQGVLQFHUHO\UDWKHUWKDQZLWKDQH\HWRVWUDWHJLFPDQLSXODWLRQ´ If it succeeds 
in meeting these requirements, Habermas believes ± or perhaps hopes in the Kantian 
sense ± WKDWWKHEHWWHUDUJXPHQWVSUHVHQWHGZLWKLQZKDW%HQKDELEFDOOVD³GLVFXUVLYH
cRPPXQLFDWLYHFRQFHSWRIUDWLRQDOLW\´ZLOOZLQout in the long run.73 
Some might object that this newfound flexibility LVWKHUHVXOWQRWRI+DEHUPDV¶V
engagement with Arendt but of the fact that political theory is less conducive to 
idealization than the underlying basis of communication and social interaction. However, 
this claim makes little sense. In recent decades political philosophers have produced a 
number of highly abstract models. Perhaps the most notable example is Rawls¶V ³RULJLQDO
SRVLWLRQ´ZKLFKVHHNVWRreach political agreement by forcing abstract individuals to 
choose the basic principles of justice that will govern their future society while sitting 
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EHKLQGD³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´WKDWEORFNVRXWDOORIWKHIHDWXUHVthat will define their 
position within the social order (ethnicity, education, talents, etc.).74 
Habermas engages deeply with Rawls during this period, criticizing him precisely 
for his excessive formalism and his blindness to the inescapable fact of human plurality. 
Instead of having individuals abstract away from their individual identities, as Rawls 
requires, Habermas encourages citizens to both embrace and transcend their 
particularities in order to buiOGD³ZH-perspective´ that takes these differences into 
account. He argues that precisely E\WDNLQJ³WKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIHYHU\RQHHOVHDQGWKXV
project[ing] KHUVHOILQWRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIVHOIDQGZRUOGRIDOORWKHUV´LQGLYLGXDOV in 
a society can reach a political understanding with each other. Unlike Rawls, who seeks to 
KRPRJHQL]HWKHXQLTXHQHVVRIFLWL]HQVWKURXJKWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOGHYLFHRIWKH³YHLORI
LJQRUDQFH´LQKLVSROLWLFDOWKHRU\+DEHUPDVVHHNV WR³LQFOXGHWKHRWKHU´E\recognizing 
the need ³WRFRSHZLWKWKHLUUHGXFLEOHSOXUDOLW\RIZRUOGYLHZV´LQWKHPRGHUQSXEOLF
sphere.75 
This formulation ± and its emphasis on the importance of individual identity in 
political life ± is strikingly similar WR$UHQGW¶VDUJXPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHimportance of 
human plurality in politics. It is also reminiscent of her claim that the world of politics 
EXLOWRQ³ZRUGVDQGGHHGV´LVZKHUHLQGLYLGXDOVFDQDSSHDUDV³XQLTXHXQH[FKDQJHDEOH
and unrepeatable entities.´76 +DEHUPDVHYHQFLWHV$UHQGW¶VQRWLRQRISOXUDOLW\ in stressing 
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the important role that interaction with others plays in human individuation.77 By 
focusing less on ideal speech and more on a common commitment to making mutually 
binding decisions through shared institutions that respect the input of all citizens, 
+DEHUPDV¶VSROLWLFDOWKHRU\ begins to sound like a slightly rationalized, more systematic 
version $UHQGW¶VDJRQLVWLFFRQFHSWLRQRIpolitics as ³acting LQFRQFHUW´ In this sense, it is 
SRVVLEOHWRVD\WKDW³+DEHUPDV¶VFRQFHSWLRQVRIDFWLRQDQGSRZHU, inasmuch as they 
reflect Arendtian commitments, demonstrate that disclosure in the political realm entails 
WKHFRQILJXUDWLRQRIDQHZVSDFHRISROLWLFDOLQWHUDFWLRQDPRQJDFWRUV´78 
,KDYHDOUHDG\VKRZQKRZ+DEHUPDV¶VLQFUHDVLQJHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$UHQGWGXULQJ
his political turn has led him to reframe some of his more rigid, idealistic formulations, 
such as his commitments to the idea of ideal speech and the consensus theory of truth. 
TKLVLVSDUWRIDEURDGHUDWWHPSWE\+DEHUPDVWR³GLVWDQF>H@KLPVHOIIURPKLVHDUOLHU
XQFRPSURPLVLQJIRUPDOLVP´,QPRYLQJ from social theory to politics, Simone Chambers 
QRWHVWKDW+DEHUPDVKDVEHHQIRUFHGWRDGPLWWKDW³SUDFWLFDOGLVFRXUVHLVSULPDULO\
intended to be an undertaking in the real (less than ideal) world by real (less than ideal) 
VRFLDODFWRUV´ ,QKLVSROLWLFDOWKHRU\WKHUHIRUH³PDMRULW\UXOHVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGQRW
as a resting point on the way to a counterfactually anticipated consensus, but as a means 
RISURYLVLRQDOFORVXUHLQDQRQJRLQJSURFHVVLQZKLFKFLWL]HQVOHDUQIURPRQHDQRWKHU¶V
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interpretations without necessarily agreeing on shared principles or a single right 
DQVZHU´79 
In contrast to his earlier avoidance of Arendt, his recent ZRUN³RIIHUVKLV
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UHQGW¶VOHJDF\LQKLVRZQSROLWLFDOWKHRU\´SDUWLFXODUO\DVUHJDUGVWKH
power of people to influence parliament through the informal public sphere as well as the 
LGHDWKDW³DFWLQJLQFRQFHUW´FDQ± LQ+DEHUPDV¶VZRUGV± play the role of the 
³DXWKRUL]LQJIRUFHH[SUHVVHGLQµMXULJHQHVLV¶± the creation of legitimate law ± and in the 
IRXQGLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV´80 Compared to his earlier readings of $UHQGWDVDWKHRULVWRI³WKH
SULQFLSOHRISRSXODUGLVFXVVLRQZLWKRXWGRPLQDWLRQ´+DEHUPDVQRZHPSKDVL]HVKHU
distinction between political power and violence, where the latter can act as an 
communicatively-PHGLDWHG³DXWKRUL]LQJIRUFH´IRU³WKHFUHDWLRQRI OHJLWLPDWHODZ´
Instead of emphasizing agreement, Habermas now quotes Arendt in order to stress the 
³HQODUJHGPHQWDOLW\´PDGHSRVVLEOHE\WKH³KXPDQDELOLW\QRWMXVWWRDFWEXWWRDFWLQ
conceUW´81 While this interpretation may not be completely accurate as an interpretion of 
Arendt, it is certainly less ³distorted´ than the readings of her work that Habermas 
offered in his second period. 
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$UHQGWLQ+DEHUPDV¶V5HOLJLRXV7XUQ 
$UHQGW¶VLQIOXHQFHLVYLVLEOHQRWRQO\LQ+DEHUPDV¶VSROLWLFDOWKHRU\EXWDOVRLn 
the writings of his post-2000 ³WKHRORJLFDO´ turn, which was motivated by the attacks of 
9/11 and the religious conflicts that followed in its wake.82 His explicit engagement with 
religion is a major change in the direction, as geopolitical events have forced Habermas 
WRFRQIURQWWKHGHSWKRIDFWXDOGLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUFUXFLDOLVVXHVDWWKHKHDUWRISHRSOH¶V
moral and religious convictions. Although he did not engage extensively with religion in 
the 1960s and 70s, when he did so it was through the prism of Marxist ideology critique 
that saw religion as a source of repression. However, in his second period he moves 
towards a position inspired more by Max Weber and Émile Durkheim than by Marx. In 
line with the secularization thesis, Habermas argues that the process of modernization has 
translated the basic insights of the sacred into a secular vocabulary that is accessible to 
all.83 
+DEHUPDV¶VUHFHQWZRUNJRHVEH\RQGHYHQ'XUNKHLPLQDGPLWWLQJ³WKHSRVVLELOLW\
RIDFRQWLQXHGµPLJUDWLRQRIWKHRORJLFDOFRQWHQWVLQWRWKHVHFXODU¶´*LYHQWKHJURZLQJ
DZDUHQHVVWKDW³VRPHWKLQJLVPLVVLQJ´LQRXU³DPELYDOHQWPRGHUQDJH´KHDIILUPVQRW
RQO\WKDW³SKLORVRSK\PXVWEHUHDG\WROHDUQIURPWKHRORJ\´EXWDOVRWKDW³UHOLJLRXV
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convictions have an epistemological status that LVQRWSXUHO\DQGVLPSO\LUUDWLRQDO´84 
Referring explicitly to Arendt, he argues that the realm of the sacred has a role to play in 
³those spontaneous and inspiring countercurrents that emerge, in opposition to a highly 
bureaucratized politics, within civiOVRFLHW\DQGWKHSROLWLFDOSXEOLFVSKHUH´Religion is 
no longer simply part of the genealogy of reason; it has become a resource of normative 
inspiration in the present.85  
In this period Habermas repeatedly notes that ³$UHQGWKDVSRLQWHGWRµSOXUDOLW\¶Ds 
DIXQGDPHQWDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIKXPDQH[LVWHQFH´86 Although he retains his belief in the 
possibility of discourse to bridge these differences, he has become somewhat less 
sanguine about the possibility of rational conversation to fully overcome these 
fundamental disagreements. This shift is related to the broader failure of the 
VHFXODUL]DWLRQWKHVLV$V3HWHU%HUJHUSRLQWVRXW³2XUDJHLVQRWDQDJHRIVHFXODUL]DWLRQ
On the contrary, it is an age of exuberant religiosity, much of it in the form of passionate 
PRYHPHQWVZLWKJOREDORXWUHDFK´ Given the continued salience of religion, Habermas 
notes that (XURSHLVWKHRXWOLHU³9LHZHGLQWHUPVRIZRUOGKLVWRU\0D[:HEHU¶V
µ2FFLGHQWDO5DWLRQDOLVP¶QRZDSSHDUVWREHWKHDFWXDOGHYLDWLRQ´87 As a result, 
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Habermas comes to argue that modern societies might benefit from the presence of 
believers, who are able to salvage (bergen) valuable resources for solidarity and moral 
motivation from their faith traditions.88 
As part of his more frequent engagement with Arendt in this period, Habermas 
has also credited her ideas in other contexts. For example, the posthumous publication of 
$UHQGW¶VJewish Writings (2007) lead Habermas to recognize her as a ³FOHYHUKLVWRULDQRI
anti-Semitism.´He notes how astutely she analyzes the impossibility of full assimilation 
IRU-HZVZKRZHUHJUDQWHGWKH³FXULRXVFRPSOLPHQWWKDWRQHFRXOGQRORQJHUHYHQWHOO
WKHLUGHVFHQWWKH\ZHUHVXSSRVHGWREH-HZVEXWQRWEHOLNH-HZV´89 This helps 
Habermas to reaffirm his long-standing argument about the central place of the Holocaust 
in postwar German identity.90 
Habermas also builds on Arendt in his rejection of human genetic manipulation. 
Although he seeks to translate a number of religious objections to such interference into 
secular terms, he has also deployed her concept of natality to bolster his argument. 
Habermas starts by noting that Arendt is one of the few philosophers to recognize that 
ELUWK³EHLQJDQDWXUDOIDFWPHHWVWKHFRQFHSWXDOUHTXLUHPHQWRIFRQVWLWXWLQJDEHJLQQLQJ
we cannot coQWURO´7KLV lack of control is important because the ³H[SHFWDWLRQRIWKH
XQH[SHFWHG´LV³LQYHVWHGZLWKWKHKRSHIRUVRPHWKLQJHQWLUHO\RWKHUWRFRPHDQGEUHDN
WKHFKDLQRIHWHUQDOUHFXUUHQFH´He argues that intentional interference endangers this the 
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possibility of the unexpected within the natality of birth by inserting direct human 
intentions into this process.91 
Habermas concludes that although an individual born in this way may be able to 
FRPHWRWHUPVZLWK³WKHVHGLPHQWHGLQWHQWLRQRIDWKLUGSHUVRQLQRQH¶VKHUHGLWDU\
IDFWRUV´VKHZLOOQRWEHDEOH³WRVHHWKHSURJUDPPHU¶VLQWHQWLRQUHDFKLQJWKURXJKWKH
genome, as a cRQWLQJHQWFLUFXPVWDQFHUHVWULFWLQJKHUVFRSHRIDFWLRQ´92 The 
SUHGLVSRVLWLRQVLQVHUWHGLQWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VJHQHWLFFRGHmean that a child has no longer 
EHHQ³ERUQXQWRXV´$UHQGWZLWKXQH[SHFWHGSRVVLELOLWLHVEXWKDVEHHQERUQWRVHUYHD
particular purpose. This adds a level of predictability to birth that endangers its status as a 
potential VLWHRI³QHZEHJLQQLQJV´93 This engagement with Arendt has even caused him 
to move away from some of his earlier concerns about her reactionary political views. 
For example, in 2009 Habermas even exclaimed³I never thought that any version of 
µFRQVHUYDWLVP¶ZRXOGDSSO\WRPHEXWµELRFRQVHUYDWLVP¶LVDZRQGHUIXOWHUP´94 
It can hardly be a coincidence that Habermas has increasingly drawn on Arendt as 
he has sought to translate his social theoretic understanding of communicative action into 
political and religious terms. A possible explanation for this change of heart is that as the 
undisputed leader the Frankfurt School, Habermas may now feel more comfortable 
confessing his debt to Arendt than he was as a young scholar in the 1960s. Additionally, 
he may still EHILJKWLQJ³WKHXJO\SUHMXGLFHWKDWZRPHQFDQQRWGRSKLORVRSK\.´95 
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Although he notes that ³>W@Rday her political philosophy is a fixed part of the 
curriculum,´ such misogynistic ideas are unfortunately far from dead.96 Given the 
reservations he voiced about the discipline of philosophy early in his career, when he was 
in a rather tenuous position, emphasizing her work may be an attempt to use his position 
to further open the canon to new thinkers. 
There may also be more substantive reasons for this reversal. Although the 
FRQWURYHUV\RYHU+HLGHJJHU¶V1D]LVPFRQWLQXHVWKHSXEOLFDWLRQVRI$UHQGW¶V writings on 
Judaism, as well as her correspondence and Denktagebuch (intellectual journal), may 
KDYHDOOD\HGVRPHRI+DEHUPDV¶VIHDUV about her theoretical approach. In particular, 
these previously unpublished, private writings demonstrate the profound influence of 
Jaspers, a figure that Habermas also admires, RQ$UHQGW¶VSROLWLFDOWKRXJKW Connecting 
Arendt more to Jaspers than Heidegger may have helped Habermas to acknowledge her 
as an important touchstone for his philosophical project.97 
Regardless of the actual reasons IRU+DEHUPDV¶Vnewfound willingness to 
publically acknowledge his debt to Arendt, it is clear that his recent desire to apply his 
theoretical insights more directly to politics has led him to reengage with important 
insights from her work. Although much of the secondary literature has overlooked this 
FRQQHFWLRQ9LOODPDNHVDQLPSRUWDQWSRLQWLQQRWLQJWKDW³DVDPRWWRµWKHUHFRYHU\RI
WKHSXEOLFUHDOP¶FDSWXUHVPRUHRUOHVVDGHTXDWHO\WKHSULPDU\JRDORI+DQQDK$UHQGW
V
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political philosRSK\DQGWKHFULWLFDOWKHRU\RI-UJHQ+DEHUPDV´98 Although this 
statement applies most obviously to his UHFHQWZRUN,KDYHDUJXHGWKDW+DEHUPDV¶V
under-appreciated debt to Arendt is visible throughout his philosophical project. 
 
Concluding Reflections 
My basic thesis is WKDW$UHQGW¶Vincreasing LQIOXHQFHRQ+DEHUPDV¶Vthought helps 
to explain the greater flexibility and appreciation for human plurality in his recent work. 
My argument shows that engaging Arendt can help to clarify the transition from the 
abstract, rationalistic DQGKLJKO\V\VWHPDWLFVRFLDOWKHRU\RI+DEHUPDV¶Vsecond period to 
his more political theory, which emphasizes real political discussions in the chaotic 
public sphere. I have also sought to provide some explanations for why Habermas has 
engaged so extensively and publicly with Arendt in his later work after downplaying her 
significance in most of his early writings. 
This argument also has important implications for the history of twentieth century 
continental political thought. As intellectual history, it is part of a broader scholarly 
attempt WRSURYLGH³DQHZYDQWDJHSRLQWRQWKHKLVWRU\RI(XURSHDQWKRXJKWLQWKHODWHU
twentieth century insofar as existentialism and critical theory are rightly considered two 
of the largest camps whose interrelations were rarely cordial.´99 +DEHUPDV¶VUHFHQW 
emphasis on ³PXWXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´LQVWHDGRIDJUHHPHQWRUFRQVHQVXV as the goal of 
political discourse and his newfound openness to religion are the products, at least in part, 
of his engagement with Arendtian insights about the role of dialogue in producing the 
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³HQODUJHGPHQWDOLW\´QHFHVVDUy for citizens divided by LUUHFRQFLODEOHSOXUDOLVPWR³DFWLQ
FRQFHUW´+DEHUPDV¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQJDJHZLWK$UHQGWLQKLVVHFRQGDQGWKLUGSHULRds 
may thus also provide him with a greater awareness of the possibilities for fruitful 
interaction between critical theory and phenomenology by making him somewhat less 
wary of drawing on insights from this tradition. 
Despite these theoretical and institutional differences, both Arendt and Habermas 
are committed to engaging in open public debate. Additionally, their perspectives are 
both defined by their SHUVRQDO³FRQIURQWDWLRQZith the legacy of the Nazi past.´100 This 
lHDGVWRDQXPEHURILQWHUHVWLQJFRQIOXHQFHV)RUH[DPSOH+DEHUPDV¶VYRFDO
endorsement of the European Union bears a striking resemblance to her own surprising 
for the European movement.101 Additionally, his calls for the development of a global 
³SRVWQDWLRQDOFRQVWHOODWLRQ´FDSDEOHRILPSOHPHQWLQJD.DQWLDQ³ZRUOGGRPHVWLFSROLF\´
(WeltinnenpolitikZLWKRXWZRUOGJRYHUQPHQWLVVWULNLQJO\VLPLODUWR$UHQGW¶V
IUDJPHQWDU\LQFRPSOHWHVXJJHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDIHGHUDWHG³IUamework 
of universal agreements.´102 The frequent forays of both Arendt and Habermas into 
political affairs shows that far from being an abstruse undertaking, political theory can 
and should have an effect on the real world. 
The fact that both Arendt and Habermas both seek to bring theory and praxis 
together also has important implications for how political philosophy can be integrated 
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into the study of politics. In contrast to calls from sympathetic critics like David Mayhew 
for political theory to EHFRPH³DVRXUFHRIRQWRORJLFDOLOOXPLQDWLRQ´WKDWIRFXVHVRQ
³ZKDWSRVLWLYHSROLWLFDOVFLHQFHFRPSOLFDWHGO\is,´ both Arendt and Habermas argue that 
empirical questions cannot be separated from normative concerns.103 They contend that 
RQWRORJLFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQVLQWR³WKHQDWXUHRISROLWLFDOUHDOLW\´FDQQRWEHVHSDUDWHGIURP
assumptions about what that political reality is and should look like. This connection 
between the is and the ought is immediately visible in the important role that the idea of 
crisis plays in their ³SUREOHP-GULYHQ´DSSURDFKHVWRSROLWLFV.104 
 Despite their differences, both Arendt and Habermas are engaged in what 
Horkheimer calls ³SKLORVRSKLFDOO\oriented social research.´105 For Arendt what is 
important are not the timeless problems of philosophy ³WKDWmay be of great relevance to 
man in the singular,´EXWWKHissues that arise from within contemporary political life. 
This is most visible in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), where she identifies 
political evil and statelessness as the most daunting problems of the twentieth century. 
Based on her investigations of the interwar crisis in Europe, ZKHUH³WKHQDWLRQKDG
FRQTXHUHGWKHVWDWH´Arendt DUJXHV³We become aware of the existence of a right to 
KDYHULJKWV«and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when 
                                                 
103
  David R. Mayhew, "Political Science and Political Philosophy: Ontological Not 
Normative," PS: Political Science and Politics 22, no. 2 (June, 2000), 192-3. 
104
  Ian Shapiro, "Problems, Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics, Or what's 
Wrong with Political Science and what to do about it," Political Theory 30, no. 4 (2002). 
105
  Max Horkheimer, "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an 
Institute for Social Research" in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early 
Writings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 14. 
 42 
millions of people emerge who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the 
QHZJOREDOSROLWLFDOVLWXDWLRQ´106 
Although Habermas draws his inspiration from a different theoretical tradition 
than Arendt, he too seeks to use empirical research to inform critical ³diagnoses of the 
present´Zeitdiagnosen). His blend of diagnostic analysis followed by normative 
reflections on possible solutions to the problems revealed in the pathologies of the 
present is visible in his recent work on the European Union. In these political writings he 
responds to the problems that have revealed themselves since 2010 by blending empirical 
analysis and normative reflection on how things ought to be with a call to political action 
directed to both the leaders and the peoples of Europe. This has led him to engage in 
debates not only with empirical political scientists regarding the future of Europe, but 
also leading political figures.107 
 Despite their differences, Arendt and Habermas bridge the empirical/normative 
divide in their academic writings and in their interventions in the public sphere. Unlike 
some public intellectuals, who use their stature to make partisan interventions, both 
Arendt and Habermas use their political writings to test and apply their theoretical ideas 
to the real world. Reading Habermas through the lens of Arendt not only reveals her 
crucial importance to his theoretical development as an intellectual forerunner for 
discourse theory; it also helps to clarify the central importance of political concerns for 
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Habermas, thus countering accusations of him as an abstract thinker whose thought is 
LUUHOHYDQWWR³UHDOSROLWLFV´ 
 
